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4.1  Introduction 
In recent years much attention has been focused on public in-kind 
subsidies for food, education, medical care, and housing. While the 
majority of past efforts have dealt with in-kind transfers, recent attention 
has been drawn to other types of public subsidies for similar commodities 
(e.g., tax expenditures for employer-provided medical care and for home 
mortgage  interest  deductions).  Often the value of  these  non-means- 
tested in-kind subsidies dwarf the more readily available and noticeable 
value of means-tested in-kind transfers. For instance, the market value of 
means-tested in-kind transfers for rented public housing in 1980 was $5.0 
billion  as compared to $20.8 billion  in  tax  deductions for mortgage 
interest and property taxes, and foregone revenues from tax-exempt 
bonds to finance mortgages (Smeeding 1982, table A-1). 
In response to criticisms of  the increasingly limited value of  money 
income statistics, the U.S. Bureau of the Census began in 1980 to collect 
data on recipiency of  several types of  in-kind subsidies: major in-kind 
transfer benefits and employer-provided, tax-subsidized health and pen- 
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sion benefits (U.S. Bureau of  the Census 1981). Further, the 1978 and 
1979 Income Survey Development Program (ISDP) research panels for 
the planned  Survey of  Income and Program Participation  (SIPP) ex- 
tended these efforts to cover government-subsidized mortgages, tax-free 
employer-provided subsidies, and income tax information (see Manser 
1981; 1982). However, while surveys can fairly easily assess noncash 
benefit  recipiency , subject  to  sampling and  nonsampling error,  the 
measurement and valuation of  these benefits are much more problem- 
atic. Researchers in this area should be quick to discover that no one 
measure of  the value of  in-kind benefits is adequate for all uses of such 
data. Rather, depending on the purposes to which the data will be put, 
different approaches to measuring and valuing in-kind subsidies will be 
appropriate. 
This paper proposes a set of conceptual approaches for measuring and 
valuing in-kind subsidies for budgetary purposes and for distributing their 
benefits to recipients and nonrecipients.  Section 4.2 presents a set of 
alternative measures of  the value of  public in-kind subsidies which, for 
purposes of this paper, are defined below. Although this analysis  could be 
extended to include nonpublic in-kind subsidies (e.g., employer-pro- 
vided meals, housing, and free transportation; or private charitable pro- 
vision of  food and shelter), we will concentrate only on public sector 
in-kind  subsidies.  Section  4.3 illustrates  the  use  of  these  various 
approaches by providing alternative estimates of the efficiency  of govern- 
ment-provided subsidies and estimates of the size distribution of in-kind 
benefits for a selected set of medical care and housing subsidies in 1979. 
Section 4.4 summarizes the results of  the paper and the implications of 
these measures for social accounting for public in-kind subsidies. 
This paper will consider both direct and indirect public in-kind sub- 
sidies. Direct public in-kind subsidies, or in-kind transfers, are defined as 
publicly provided benefits in the form of  goods and services of  a private 
good nature which are received without fully reciprocal quid pro quo 
provision of  goods or services by  the recipient. These direct subsidies 
include traditional types of means-tested in-kind transfers, such as Medi- 
caid or public housing, and also direct subsidies such as FHA, FHMA, 
and VA mortgage interest subsidies for home ownership. Indirect in-kind 
subsidies take the form of tax expenditures that reduce the market price 
of specific private goods or services by exclusion from tax, by deduction 
from the tax base, or by tax credit. While these subsidies do not directly 
enter government budgetary accounts as expenditures, they can gener- 
ally be thought of  as alternatives to direct subsidy programs of  equal 
dollar cost, despite practical differences that may lead Congress to choose 
indirect  subsidies over direct  subsidies, or vice  versa  (Congressional 
Budget Office 1981). For purposes of this paper, the important point is 
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same effect on government budgets as an equal-cost direct expenditure. 
In accounting for the budgetary cost and distributional effects of  public 
in-kind subsidies both direct and indirect subsidies need to be explicitly 
recognized. 
4.2  Conceptual Approaches to Measuring and 
Valuing In-Kind Subsidies 
Researchers and policymakers need to realize that no single measure of 
the value of  in-kind subsidies is adequate for all uses.  Strategies for 
valuing in-kind benefits depend on how the data will be used. Unfortu- 
nately many research studies have not established the conceptual basis 
for their approach to measuring and valuing in-kind benefits, despite the 
fact that use of  inappropriate measures of  value may lead to incorrect 
conclusions concerning their efficiency cost or distributional effect, and 
thus to incorrect policy decisions. 
Before examining each valuation technique in detail, it is useful to 
understand the major conceptual differences between them and their 
general relationship to one another. Market value is the private market 
cost of  the goods and services transferred to the recipient net of  any 
required recipient payment. Government cost is the total delivery cost of 
these goods, which may be provided by government at, below, or above 
their private market value. If government cost falls below market value, 
efficiency benefits accrue from government production of  the good or 
service being transferred. On the other hand, if government cost exceeds 
market  value  the  efficiency costs are borne  by  the taxpayer.  These 
differences are important in determining whether the government should 
actually produce a given good, or whether they should merely provide the 
good by  means of  subsidizing private market consumption. The social 
benefit value to recipients and taxpayers must be at least as large as the 
government cost if the provision of a given benefit is to be efficient in an 
economic sense.' 
While market value, government cost, and social benefit value are 
essentially valuation concepts related to economic efficiency, other mea- 
sures of  value are preferred for assessing the distributional impact of 
in-kind subsidies. For instance, recipient or cash equivalent value is the 
cash amount for which recipients would be willing to trade their right to 
the in-kind subsidy given their current incomes (including cash and other 
in-kind subsidies). In general, the cash equivalent value is no more than 
the market value of  the in-kind benefit and is the proper concept for 
measuring the distributional impact of in-kind subsidies on beneficiaries 
incomes and well-being. 
For distributional purposes, the aggregate difference between the so- 
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program, with total recipient benefits equal to the cash equivalent value 
of the in-kind subsidy, serves as an upper-bound measure of nonrecipient 
benefits. Because we cannot estimate social benefit value, these nonre- 
cipient benefits are approximated by the extra government cost involved 
in providing in-kind transfers instead of  lesser amounts of  cash transfer 
which would have the same welfare value to recipients. Several potential 
types of  nonrecipient  benefits will  be mentioned, and their aggregate 
value will be distributed among taxpayers. A framework similar in part to 
this one has been  previously suggested for public housing programs 
(DeSalvo 1971), though no actual estimates of value were presented and 
nonhousing programs were not considered. The remainder of this section 
discusses these different concepts of value with reference to housing and 
medical care subsidies. 
4.2.1  Market Value 
The market value of  an in-kind transfer is equal to the private market 
cost or the purchasing power of  benefits received by  the individual. 
In-kind transfers present beneficiaries with control over some amount of 
economic resources  that  usually  can  be  bought  and thus have  been 
explicitly valued in the private market. Because market value is intui- 
tively appealing to economists and relatively easy to estimate in many 
cases, it  is the measure  most  often used in  studies of  the value and 
distribution of in-kind transfer benefits. In some cases (e.g., food stamps) 
the market  value  is  directly measurable  as the  dollar value  of  food 
coupons in the market. 
In other cases, however, market value must be estimated. For instance, 
the market value of  medical care transfers (e.g., Medicare) as medical 
insurance can be estimated as the sum of vendor payments net of benefici- 
ary charges (e.g., the Medicare supplemental medical insurance pre- 
mium), plus private sector claims-processing cost, plus selling costs. In 
the case of  public housing transfers the conceptual measure of  market 
value is easily defined as the difference between the private market rental 
value of  the unit and the rent actually paid by public housing tenants. 
Estimating market value for public housing becomes problematic be- 
cause the private market rental value is not known. 
The market value of  indirect subsidies from exclusion of  employer- 
provided benefits is the income and payroll tax savings (i.e., the dollar 
value of untaxed income times the appropriate marginal federal income 
and payroll tax rate). In the area of  health care two types of  indirect 
subsidies may be noted: the tax exclusion of employer-paid health insur- 
ance premiums, and the tax deductibility of the first $150 of direct health 
insurance expenses, plus out-of-pocket expenses in excess of 3 percent of 
adjusted gross income. Indirect tax subsidies for housing primarily ben- 
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deductions, deferral of capital gains on home sales, and the exclusion of 
the first $125,000 of capital gain for qualifying elderly home owners. 
When measuring the market value of  indirect tax subsidies it may be 
important to realize that estimates are based on current lost tax revenues 
and do not account for the behavioral response of taxpayers to changes in 
the amount or form of the subsidy. For instance, Ginsburg (1981a, p. 8) 
has predicted that full taxation of  employer-provided health insurance 
might decrease the proportion of medical expenses covered by insurance 
(and thus we assume health insurance purchases) by 25 percent. As long 
as the 25 percent decline in health insurance purchases are not deferred to 
other nontaxable forms of  compensation (e.g., pension plan contribu- 
tions), the estimated market value of  the tax subsidy and its budgetary 
effects will  not  differ considerably. However in  the case of  housing 
subsidies, removal or limitation of  mortgage interest tax deductibility 
may lead to windfall capital losses for home owners and thus may sub- 
stantially affect capital gains tax revenues. In estimating both the market 
value and government cost of indirect housing and medical subsidies we 
do not account for the effects of  behavioral response. 
The market value concept is sometimes used for program budgeting by 
administering agencies and, in some cases, by the Congressional Budget 
Office. In situations where overhead costs can be assumed not to vary 
with the proposed program adjustment, changes in market value can be 
an accurate predictor of the net change in government or budgetary cost. 
However, in cases where government cost and market value vary signifi- 
cantly the government  cost measure should be  used to estimate the 
budgetary impacts of program changes. Market value has also been used, 
though, as we will argue below, incorrectly, in studies of  the distribu- 
tional impact of  in-kind programs  and their effect on poverty  status 
(Congressional Budget Office 1977;  Hoagland 1980; Paglin 1980;  Brown- 
ing 1976). 
4.2.2  Government Cost 
To measure the net budgetary  impact of  a proposed  change in  an 
in-kind subsidy program, or to compare the economic efficiency of public 
sector provision vs. public sector production of  an in-kind subsidy, a 
measure of  the total government cost of  producing (or providing) the 
given benefit is required. Government cost includes the dollar cost of 
benefits provided plus all of the associated economic costs of production 
(or provision) and program management.2 Government cost is net of 
recipient contributions to the program, should there be any. Because, as 
generally calculated, it  includes all direct  costs of  providing a given 
benefit, government cost is normally the proper measure to determine 
net changes in budget outlays resulting from a given change in program 
rules and regulations. For instance, in the case of indirect tax subsidiza- 144  Timothy M. Smeeding 
tion, the government cost is simply the market value of the subsidy-the 
foregone tax revenue plus the administrative-processing and enforce- 
ment costs associated with the additional tax preference provisions. 
Government cost may also be compared to the market value of in-kind 
subsidies to determine the net efficiency cost or efficiency benefits from 
the form in which the transfer is provided. For instance, consider the 
Medicare program wherein government is the producer as well as the 
provider of health insurance coverage. The government cost is the cost of 
vendor payments plus claims-processing  and enforcement costs. Suppose 
that, as has been recently suggested, the delivery mechanism for Medi- 
care was changed to an equal outlay voucher system whereby the govern- 
ment  provided  beneficiaries with  a voucher which  could be  used  to 
purchase private health insurance (Ginsburg 1981b). Unfortunately such 
a change would not be cost efficient. Private insurance carriers typically 
have high selling and marketing costs, or load factors, which would be 
reflected in premiums charged Medicare voucher holders. Because Medi- 
care avoids these selling and marketing costs, and because of comparable 
claims-processing costs for government and private insurers, fewer ben- 
efits in terms of covered medical services could be purchased through the 
private sector with equal cost vouchers for all beneficiaries, as compared 
to the current Medicare program. Based on this discussion, the govern- 
ment cost of  the Medicare program  appears to be below the private 
market value of the medical care benefits provided by the program. If this 
is so, efficiency benefits are being realized from the current method of 
Medicare health insurance provision. Changing to an alternative form of 
benefit provision, such as a voucher plan, would probably increase gov- 
ernment cost to the private market value of  benefits being pr~vided.~ 
On the other hand, current public housing programs have been criti- 
cized because of their high cost in excess of the market value of housing 
benefits provided (Rydell, Mulford, and Helbers 1980; Weinberg 1982). 
Recent  analysis  of  the  Experimental  Housing  Allowance  Program 
(EHAP) whereby tenant beneficiaries received vouchers for a specified 
portion of their rent indicates far lower cost for equivalent market value 
housing benefits (Rydell, Mulford, and Helbers 1980). These findings 
suggest that changing the form of public housing subsidies could substan- 
tially reduce the government cost of providing housing benefits by reduc- 
ing the attendant efficiency costs associated with current program de- 
signs. 
4.2.3  Social Benefit Value 
The social benefit value of a public transfer program must be at least as 
great as the government cost to justify the program. The social benefit 
value should include spillover effects (consumption and production ex- 
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who finance the program, as well as benefits to the program recipient net 
of  recipient charges. Social benefit values will not be presented in this 
paper because of  difficulties in estimating their dollar value. However 
most social benefit values from in-kind transfers take the form of nonre- 
cipient benefits, which are discussed below. 
The market value, government cost, and social benefit value concepts 
are useful in determining the efficiency of government-provided in-kind 
subsidies and their budgetary impact. They are less well suited for assess- 
ing the distributional  effects of  in-kind subsidies, where measures of 
recipient (cash equivalent) value and nonrecipient value are preferable. 
4.2.4  Recipient or Cash Equivalent Value 
If  in-kind subsidies distort consumption patterns, they add less to a 
recipient’s economic well-being than an equal-dollar-cost cash subsidy. If 
so, they should be discounted to their recipient value to reflect this fact. If 
consumption patterns are not distorted by the in-kind transfer, the recip- 
ient value and market value of  the subsidy will be  Only in this case 
is market value an acceptable substitute for  recipient value when measur- 
ing the distributive effect of  recipient benefits from in-kind subsidies. 
Recipient value reflects the program beneficiary’s own valuation of  the 
benefit and can be measured by the amount of cash transfer that would 
make the recipient just as well-off as the in-kind transfer. The recipient 
value is also known as the cash equivalent value and is formally termed 
the “Hicksian equivalent variation” after Sir John Hicks (1943). Most 
economists agree that cash equivalent value is the proper measure for 
valuing in-kind transfers to evaluate their impact on economic well-being 
and the income size distribution because it translates the market value of 
goods into cash values conceptually equivalent to the money incomes to 
which they are added (Smeeding and Moon 1980; Smeeding 1982). 
In theory, the recipient or cash equivalent value can be estimated by 
assigning a utility function to subsidy recipients. The cash equivalent 
value measure is the amount of  cash subsidy that would leave the recip- 
ient at the same level of  well-being or utility as the market value of  the 
in-kind transfer. However, because utility functions cannot be observed 
and measured with any degree of  accuracy, and because of  difficulties 
with current consumption data, a simplified measure of recipient value, 
which is explained in section 4.3.2,  has been developed as a substitute. 
While the recipient value of indirect in-kind subsidies are conceptually 
no different than those for direct subsidies, cash equivalent values for 
indirect in-kind subsidies have not yet been estimated. A major problem 
with estimating cash equivalent value for both direct and indirect sub- 
sidies is the absence of a relevant counterfactual. For instance, in estimat- 
ing the cash equivalent value of the tax exclusion for employer-provided 
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insurance by similar persons in the absence of  tax advantages. While it 
may be possible to infer such values from estimates of the price elasticity 
of  demand for medical insurance, we are not able to observe the health 
insurance purchases of  a group of  unsubsidized individuals similar to 
those who now benefit from the tax advantages of  employer-provided 
health benefits. Thus, while cash equivalent value is conceptually prefer- 
able to other measures of in-kind transfer value in assessing the distribu- 
tional impact of in-kind subsidies, it is not easily or accurately estimated 
in many cases. 
4.2.5  Nonrecipient Benefits 
In most cases of  in-kind transfer, particularly in the case of  medical 
care benefits, the cash equivalent value of  in-kind subsidies is less than 
both  the  market  value  and  government  cost  of  the  in-kind  benefit 
(Smolensky et al. 1977; Cooper and Katz 1978;  Smeeding 1982).  Because 
transfer recipients could therefore be made just as well-off with a lower- 
cost cash subsidy, nonrecipient taxpayers and policymakers must also 
receive some of  the benefits from in-kind subsidies. In allocating this 
portion of  the benefits from in-kind transfers we would ideally want to 
distribute the difference between the social benefit value of  the in-kind 
subsidy and the cost of a cash transfer program, with benefits equal to the 
recipient value of  the in-kind program, to nonrecipient beneficiaries. 
However, because social benefit value is not easily estimated, we assume 
that total benefits are at least as great as the government cost of in-kind 
subsidies. We can then derive a lower-bound estimate of  nonrecipient 
benefits by taking the difference between government cost and the lower- 
cost cash transfer which leaves beneficiaries just as well-off as the in-kind 
~rogram.~ 
Recent research suggests a number of  efficiency and equity benefits 
that one might want to count in measuring the value of  nonrecipient 
benefits. For instance, in addition to production and consumption exter- 
nalities, and the paternalism of “donor benefits” (Hochman and Rodgers 
1969; Thurow 1974), in-kind subsidies may have additional efficiency 
advantages over  an  equal-cost  cash  transfer  program.  For  instance, 
Krashinsky (1980) and Nichols and Zeckhauser (1981) argue that the 
“target efficiency” (Weisbrod 1969) of  subsidy programs is greatly im- 
proved by  imposing restrictions on the choices made by  the intended 
beneficiaries. Murray (1981) has shown that means-tested in-kind trans- 
fers lead to a smaller labor supply reduction than an equal-cost cash 
transfer. In fact, certain types of in-kind transfers, such as work training 
subsidies or subsidized day care, may  actually increase labor supply 
relative to an equal-cost cash transfer  program. In  addition, worker 
training subsidies and child health and nutrition programs, such as the 
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Children Nutrition Program, may have long-term health-related invest- 
ment  benefits to both  the individuals and society that would  not  be 
realized by an equal-cost cash transfer (Garfinkel and Smeeding 1981). 
In addition to these efficiency benefits, in-kind subsidies may have 
equity  benefits  (even more  difficult to value).  For  instance, in-kind 
benefits in the form of  subsidized education or health care may enhance 
equality of opportunity to a greater extent than an equal-cost cash trans- 
fer. Equity arguments for guaranteed minimum availability of  certain 
merit goods (such as health care) can also be made (Tobin 1970; Mus- 
grave 1959), as can arguments for social risk sharing (tax subsidies for 
those experiencing catastrophic medical expenses, or Medicare coverage 
of  renal dialysis). 
Having argued for the existence of  nonrecipient benefits, we need to 
decide who the nonrecipient beneficiaries are. In general, we will argue 
that all taxpayers receive nonrecipient benefits in proportion to federal 
income tax payments. In this sense nonrecipient benefits can be treated as 
a public good.6 
However, a case can be made that specific types of  in-kind transfers 
benefit particular individuals who in the absence of the in-kind transfer 
would have provided a similar benefit to the in-kind subsidy recipient. 
For instance, take the case of Medicaid-financed nursing home expendi- 
tures. Because of  attendant program  rules and regulations, Medicaid 
nursing home beneficiaries receive little if  any net welfare gain from 
qualifying for these benefits (Smeeding 1982, pp. 53-56).  If  it can be 
argued that most such direct beneficiaries are no better-off in an eco- 
nomic sense with the transfer than without it, who benefits from these 
expenses? It can be argued that Medicaid nursing home benefits protect 
taxpayers against the direct monetary costs and indirect opportunity costs 
of  looking after aged or disabled relatives who need constant care and 
attention. On the one hand, all taxpayers are protected against this 
eventuality should it ever arise. Thus an argument for the public good 
approach can be made. On the other hand, in any given period specific 
taxpayers (sons, daughters, other relatives) who would have otherwise 
paid for these services become “secondary beneficiaries” (Lampman and 
Smeeding 1982). But because of lack of information on specific  secondary 
beneficiaries, we will not be able to allocate relevant types of  nonrecip- 
ient benefits to such individuals. 
4.3  Applications and Examples 
We are not able to provide estimates of either the efficiency measures 
or the distributional measures of  the value of  all types of  in-kind sub- 
sidies. However, we can provide some rough estimates of the effect of the 





Government Cost vs. 
Alternative Cost 
Difference in 
Current Government Cost  Alternative Government Cost 
Overhead and 
Administration: 
Overhead and  Overhead and 
Administration:  Administration: 
Value of  Dollar  (as % of  Value of  Dollar  (as % of  Dollar  (as % of 
benefits)  Total  Benefitsa  Cost  benefits)  Total  Benefitsa  Cost  benefits)  Cost 
A. Medicare 
1. Current program 




B. Public housing 
1. Current programs 
Low-rent public housing 
Rent supplement 
Section 236 
Section 8 (new) 
Section 8 (existing) 
Total 
2.  Voucher program: 
High estimate 
Low estimate 
$29.356  $28.391  $  ,965  (3.4) 
$37.382b  $28.391  $  8.991  (31.7)  $  -8.026  (-28.3) 
46.306  28.391  17.915  (63.1)  -  16.950  (- 59.7) 
34.041  28.391  5.650  (19.9)  -4.685  (- 16.5) 
31.798  28.391  3.407  (12.0)  -2.442  (-8.6) 
3.126  2.039  1.087  (53.3) 
1.017  .709  ,308  (43.5) 
1.297  ,860  ,437  (50.8) 
1.767  1.220  ,547  (44.8) 
$7.589  $5.086  $2.503  (49.2) 
.382  .258  .124  (48.1)' 
5.8Sb  5.086  302  (15.8)  1.701  (33.4) 
6.064  5.086  ,978  (19.2)  1.525  (30.0) 
1.877  (36.9)  5.712  5.086  ,626  (12.3) 149  Measuring and Valuing In-Kind Subsidies 
the distribution of program benefits for a selected set of medical care and 
housing benefits. 
4.3.1  Efficiency Measures 
In determining the net budgetary impact of  a particular in-kind sub- 
sidy, and in estimating the efficiency costs of government production vs. 
government provision of benefits, both the market value and government 
cost measures are important. In table 4.1  we have calculated the govern- 
ment cost of both Medicare and public housing as currently designed and 
the alternative cost of  a voucher program that provides the same total 
value of  benefits to recipients.’ The differences between overhead and 
administration under the current government cost and the alternative 
government cost options (in the final two columns of table 4.1) measure 
the net costs (if negative) or benefits (if positive) of changing the existing 
program delivery mechanism to a voucher program. 
In the current Medicare program (table 4.1, part A) overhead and 
administration  charges for claims processing averaged 3.4 percent of 
benefits (or claims) in  1979 (U.S. Department of  Health and Human 
Services 1980). The costs of  a change to a voucher system has been 
estimated in three ways. First, the high estimate is based on total ex- 
penses as a percent of  claims for a sample of  large and medium private 
insurance carriers providing a comprehensive major medical insurance 
policy to an employer with one employee in 1978 (Thexton 1978). While 
total insurance premiums for the elderly will differ from that of  em- 
ployees, the majority of the expenses of providing the policy, or the “load 
factor,” should be quite similar. Of the total load factor of  63.1 percent, 
Notes to  Table 4.1 
SOURCES:  Medicare,  current program:  Social  Security  Bulletin  (1982), table M-2;  U.S. 
Department of  Health and Human Services (1980). 
Medicare, voucher program: Thexton (1978); Schuttinga (1981); Ginsburg (1981b). 
Public housing,  current programs:  benefit  values:  Doyle  et al.  1980; overhead  and 
administration: low-rent public housing: Morrall and Olsen (1980); U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (1974); Section 236: Mayo et al. (1980); Murray (1980); 
Section 8 (new): Mayo et al. (1980); Weinberg (1982); Section 8 (existing): Rydell, Mul- 
ford, and Helbers (1980). 
Public housing, voucher program: Rydell, Mulford, and Helbers (1980); U.S. Depart- 
ment of  Housing and Urban Development (1979). 
“Value of  benefits are net of  beneficiary contributions. These include the supplementary 
medical insurance premium  in  Medicare  and the subsidized rental payment  by  public 
housing beneficiaries. Value of benefits in the Medicare program are measured by vendor 
payments, and in public housing programs by the difference between the private market 
rental value and the subsidized rent. 
bAlternative cost is the simple average of  the high, low, and medium estimates from the 
voucher programs in the Medicare case; and then high and low estimates in the public 
housing case. 
‘Overhead and administration for the rent supplement program is the simple average of all 
other overhead and administration charges. 150  Timothy M. Smeeding 
3.8 percent covers state insurance premium taxes, 25.5 percent goes to 
direct sales overhead and commissions,  5.5 percent for claims processing, 
and 28.3 percent  “other,”  which  includes all remaining  expenses of 
marketing  and  sales  promotion,  experience  rating  individuals,  and 
profits. 
It should be recognized that significant economies of  scale in  total 
overhead expenses exist. For instance, if  a local senior citizens group 
endorses a plan  with  fifty participants,  expense charges fall to  19.9 
percent of claims (as shown under the medium estimate). Thus the high 
estimate assumes that all Medicare voucher holders would enroll with 
private insurers and that none of the advantages of economies of scale in 
overhead  expenses  would  be  developed  through  group  sales.  The 
medium estimate is based on the assumption that all Medicare voucher 
holders enroll with private insurers, but that groups of fifty enrollees are 
formed so that economy of  scale advantages would be realized. Larger 
(smaller) groups would experience lower (higher) overall expenses. For 
instance, groups of  500 (5)  would experience total load factors of  9.8 
(46.8) percent of  claims (Thexton 1978). 
The low estimate is based on Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BC/BS) load 
factors (Schuttinga 1981) for single policies. They are lower than the 
private  insurance company expenses for several reasons.  First of  all, 
BC/BS offers larger numbers of comprehensive health insurance policies 
than supplemental policies which have a higher ratio of  load factor to 
claims. Secondly, BC/BS is a nonprofit company which in most states 
avoids the state insurance premium tax. Finally, there is some evidence 
that BC/BS cross-subsidizes single individuals at the expense of  larger 
groups (Schuttinga 1981). 
The overall total cost is the simple average of  the alternative cost 
options, implicitly assuming that some voucher holders will end up in 
each of the three alternative scenarios. The fact that all three scenarios 
currently exist despite the large differences in overhead costs apparent in 
table 4.1  justifies this averaging technique. The result of this comparison 
indicates that a Medicare voucher plan would likely have cost the U.S. 
taxpayer an additional $8.0  billion, or 28.3 percent of vendor payments 
(claims) in 1980. These comparisons indicate that the current Medicare 
delivery system, which benefits from large economies of  scale in claims 
processing,  and which  avoids the marketing,  selling, and other costs 
associated with private insurance carriers, confers substantial efficiency 
benefits to taxpayers when compared to the alternative cost (or market 
value) of  an equal benefit voucher plan. 
In the case of  public housing (table 4.1, part B) we find the opposite 
conclusions. The net market value of  public housing benefits is equal to 
market rent minus the tenant contribution  (or subsidized rent). This 
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Budget Office (Doyle et a1 1980, p. 241) Various authors (see sources to 
table 4.1) have estimated the overhead or delivery cost per dollar of 
housing services. These costs have been expressed as a percent of benefit 
value, which differs from the value of housing services by the amount of 
the tenant contribution. Depending on the specific housing program in 
question, these expenses averaged 49.2 percent of benefits and include 
such  items as construction costs and  FHA loan  subsidies for public 
housing construction, program-induced increases in rent, and the costs of 
administering the program (payments processing, eligibility recertifica- 
tion, periodic reinspection of  public housing units to ensure code com- 
pliance,  and other participant  services). The difference between  the 
market value of benefits delivered by public housing programs and the 
total government cost of these programs is quite large, totaling over $2.5 
billion in 1980. Administrative costs and overhead for public housing are 
far above the administrative costs for other in-kind programs.8 
The alternative costs of the voucher program were derived from EHAP 
(U.S. Department of  Housing and Urban Development 1979). Under 
EHAP tenants received vouchers for the difference between the esti- 
mated standard cost of adequate housing (or the fair market rent) and 25 
percent of their adjusted household income. Beneficiaries were then free 
to use this voucher to rent any dwelling that meets code requirements in 
the local area. EHAP was actually three different housing experiments, 
two of  which  (the Supply Experiment  [SE], which was  designed to 
determine the effects of  vouchers on local housing markets; and the 
Administrative Agency Experiments [AAE], which were designed to 
gather information on the costs of  delivering housing allowances) are 
used to obtain the alternative cost estimate in table 4.1. 
The SE indicates that because the housing allowance voucher plan 
subsidizes housing demand in a local area, these areas experienced a 1.2 
percent short-run increase in rental housing prices. This translates into a 
1.5  percent increase in program costs relative to the net value of benefits 
(total rent minus a tenant contribution of  roughly 30 percent of  total 
rent). Additional overhead costs derived from both the SE and the AAE 
programs are added to this amount. The high cost estimate of  $256 per 
unit per year or 17.8  percent of net benefits in table 4.1 is taken from the 
AAE experiments, while the low cost estimate, $156 or 10.8 percent of 
net  benefits, is taken from  the SE experiment (US. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development 1979, table V-1). The SE costs fall 
below the AAE  costs because of economies of scale. Each site participat- 
ing in the AAE experiments, had no more than 900 households, while 
each of  the SE sites served at least 3500 households. The implication of 
these estimates is that combining the best features of  the AAE experi- 
ments with the economies of  scale experienced in the SE experiment 
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to administrative costs below those found in the low estimate in table 4.1. 
However, conservatively assuming that not all such economies would be 
realized, we have avaraged these estimates to derive the overall govern- 
ment cost of  a voucher program with benefit values equal to those paid 
under current public housing programs.  Comparing the voucher  esti- 
mates with the current system, we find that the net efficiency costs from 
the current public housing system are estimated to be $1.7 billion or 33.4 
percent  of  the market value  of  benefits  received  by  public  housing 
tenants. 
Some care must be taken in interpreting these figures.  Because of 
existing public housing program commitments, such as contracts promis- 
ing to maintain subsidies for thirty years in the section 8 program (Con- 
gressional Budget Office 1979), and because of government-owned pub- 
lic housing  complexes,  the costs of  changing the current  phalanx of 
housing programs into a voucher system may be prohibitive. However, 
the estimates in  table  4.1 do indicate  that future low-income rental 
housing programs of the EHAP voucher type should be much more cost 
effective than additional units provided under current housing programs. 
4.3.2  Distributional Implications 
Measures of  the value of  in-kind subsidies are crucial in determining 
their distributional impact. Often public policy focuses only on means- 
tested direct subsidies or in-kind transfers because of their rapid growth 
and impact on the poverty status of  low-income households (Paglin 1980; 
Smeeding 1982). For instance, the market value of  means-tested benefits 
in the form of  Medicaid and public housing have increased from $7.2 
billion in 1970 to $31.6 billion in 1980 (Smeeding 1982, table 1). Indeed 
Medicaid, with vendor payments of $26.2 billion in 1980, is our largest 
means-tested  transfer  benefit,  far  outweighing  all  means-tested  cash 
transfer  benefits  combined  ($18.9 billion  in  1980). In contrast,  little 
attention has been focused on the distributional effects of  conceptually 
similar indirect subsidies for health care or housing. In fact, only once in 
recent years has the Treasury Department even published estimates of 
the (market) value of tax expenditures by income class (U.S.  Department 
of  the Treasury 1978). 
The distributional impact  of  direct  in-kind  subsidies is most  often 
presented in terms of  their market value with little attention focused on 
recipient value (e.g., Browning 1976; Congressional Budget Office 1977; 
Hoagland  1980). However, if  one accepts the argument that recipient 
value is the proper conceptual approach for measuring the distributional 
impact of in-kind subsidies, and if  reasonable measures of  recipient value 
can be estimated, the distributional impact of  in-kind subsidies is quite 
different from that observed when using the conventional market value 
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the rapidly growing literature on the efficiency advantages of  in-kind 
transfers, one is led to the notion of  nonrecipient  benefits and their 
distribution. 
In this section of  the paper  we  examine the  mean  value and size 
distribution of  a subset of  both direct and indirect in-kind subsidies for 
medical care and housing, comparing the results of  conventional mea- 
sures of  their value to the conceptual approaches suggested above. A 
brief  explanation  of  the  derivation  of  these  estimates precedes  the 
analysis. 
The government cost and market value of direct in-kind subsidies have 
recently been estimated by Smeeding (1982). Medical care benefits from 
Medicare and Medicaid are treated as insurance benefits accruing to the 
entire covered population according to broad beneficiary risk class (aged, 
disabled, adult, child). The government cost of  these benefits as insur- 
ance is equal to total vendor payments plus claims-processing  costs per 
state and risk-class  specific recipient. In effect this approach measures the 
price that the government would have to charge beneficiaries for insur- 
ance coverage to just break even. In the past, this measure has often been 
confused with treating the market value of  medical benefits as insurance 
(e.g.,  Hoagland  1980; Smeeding and  Moon  1980; Smeeding 1982).’ 
However, as demonstrated in section 4.2, the private market value (or 
market cost) of insurance with vendor payments equal to those of Medi- 
care (or, we assume, Medicaid) are estimated to be 28.3 percent more 
than the government cost. Both measures have been calculated from the 
March 1980 Current Population Survey (CPS) and are presented below. 
The market value of  public housing was estimated using a hedonic 
regression model employing the Annual Housing Survey (AHS) to deter- 
mine the private market rental value of  public housing based purely on 
the characteristics (quantity and quality) and location of the housing unit. 
Subtracting the reported rents paid by public housing beneficiaries (as 
reported in the AHS) from these estimates of  market rent, we arrive at 
the market value of the subsidy. Because the government cost of public 
housing has not been confused with market value, we present no distribu- 
tional estimates of  the government cost of  public housing. 
Recipient or cash equivalent value is estimated by assuming that the 
recipient value of  an in-kind transfer is equal to the normal expenditure 
on that item by unsubsidized consumer units. This procedure involved 
matching subsidized units to unsubsidized units with similar characteris- 
tics (income, size, location, and age). If  this similar nonrecipient nor- 
mally spent less than the market value of  the in-kind benefit on the 
subsidized good, the recipient value was measured by the level of normal 
expenditures. If  normal  expenditures exceed market value, recipient 
value equals market value. That is, because the in-kind transfer recipient 
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on the subsidized good, it is not restrictive and therefore has the same 
income value as a cash transfer with equal dollar benefits (Smeeding 
1982). This method  of  estimating recipient  value does not  explicitly 
employ utility functions. However, given the current state of  the art in 
estimating cash equivalent value using empirical utility functions, it has 
been suggested that the normal expenditure approach is preferable to 
such methods (Manser 1982). 
Nonrecipient value is measured by subtracting the government cost of 
a cash transfer program, with benefits equal to the aggregate recipient 
value of  the in-kind subsidy, from the government cost of  the given 
medical care or housing transfer. Overhead costs of  the cash transfer 
program are estimated to be 4.5 percent of benefits, roughly the adminis- 
trative costs in the current Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program 
and in the Seattle-New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment. The 
market value of  nonrecipient benefits is distributed by  money income 
decile in proportion to federal personal income tax payments. 
Recipient  value for indirect  subsidies has not  been  calculated and 
cannot be derived from the recipient value estimates for direct in-kind 
subsidies. Even if we were able to estimate recipient value, the nonrecip- 
ient value of tax subsidy benefits would be distributed to all taxpayers in a 
fashion similar to the distribution of  the market value of  recipient ben- 
efits. And so total recipient plus nonrecipient value for these benefits 
would be roughly equivalent to the distribution of  their market value, 
which is shown in tables 4.2-4.6. 
Nonrecipient value and the market value of  indirect subsidies were 
distributed using information from several sources. Of  primary impor- 
tance is a recent document (U.S. Department of  the Treasury 1981) 
which presents information on federal personal income tax payments by 
adjusted gross income class. Using CPS estimates of  money income 
transfers by money income decile, and assuming one tax return per CPS 
household at higher income levels, we estimated the distribution of taxes 
by CPS money income decile.’O While the resulting distribution is only a 
rough estimate of the true distribution of federal income tax liability by 
money income decile, it is quite similar to that found in other studies 
(e.g., Okner 1980). These taxes were then subtracted from money in- 
come to arrive at the “post-tax” money income distribution in tables 4.3 
and 4.5. Data from this source were also used to allocate indirect sub- 
sidies for personal health care deductions (in proportion to taxes paid by 
itemized tax returns claiming these deductions) and for property tax and 
mortgage interest deductions (also in proportion to taxes paid by item- 
ized returns claiming these deductions). 
Tax subsidies for employer-provided health insurance and sickness/ 
accident insurance were calculated directly from a March 1980 CPS data 
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marginal federal income tax and payroll tax rates (Smeeding 1981). The 
overall, average, marginal federal personal income and payroll tax sub- 
sidy was calculated to be roughly 36 percent of the employer contribution 
and was directly distributed by CPS money income decile. 
Because a prorich pattern of  benefits is most likely disequalizing, we 
will refer to patterns of  mean benefits increasing by  income decile as 
regressive.  The inverse of  this logic indicates that  a propoor,  mean 
benefit pattern is progressive. When referring to the size distribution of 
aggregate benefits, those which  have a greater (lesser) share of  total 
program subsidies for the lower income decile than their after-tax money 
income share of 1.5  percent are termed equalizing (disequalizing). Again 
the inverse applies to the share of  benefits for the highest decile, which 
receives 24.5 percent of  after-tax income. 
4.3.3  Medical Care Subsidies 
The distributional  impact  of  a subset of  medical  care subsidies is 
presented in tables 4.2 and 4.3. Both the mean value of  benefits per 
beneficiary (table 4.2) and the size distribution of  subsidies (table 4.3) 
have been calculated by  CPS money income decile for 1979. The size 
distribution of CPS money income minus personal income taxes is also 
presented  in  the  first  row  of  table 4.3.  Each  table presents various 
measures of both direct (part A) and indirect (part B) subsidies. In part C 
of  table 4.3 we have aggregated direct, indirect, and total subsidies to 
determine their net impact on the after-tax income size distribution. 
Direct subsidies in tables 4.2 and 4.3 include only Medicaid and Medi- 
care.  Roughly  $14.3  billion  in  outlays  for  veteran’s  medical  care, 
CHAMPUS (military health care), worker’s compensation,  maternal 
and child health care, and Indian health programs are omitted (Health 
Insurance Institute 1980; Social Security Bulletin 1982). Roughly 40 per- 
cent of these benefits accrue to military living on base and to the institu- 
tionalized who are not covered in the CPS. Indirect subsidies exclude 
$1.3 billion in tax deductible charitable contributions for health (Con- 
gressional Budget Office 1981). These omissions should not have a great 
effect on the net distribution of  the $68.9 billion in subsidies which are 
included in table 4.3. 
The first two rows of  table 4.2 present estimates of  mean government 
cost and market value of  direct medical subsidies. Our government cost 
estimate has been termed the “market value” in most studies (Hoagland 
1980; Smeeding 1982). Our estimate of  market value exceeds this esti- 
mate by  28.3 percent in each decile (as estimated in table 4.1). Mean 
benefits to the 22.7 million recipient households are fairly even across the 
income distribution. On the other hand, recipient value in  row 3 rises 
with income, reflecting increased willingness to pay for medical care at 
higher income levels. “Benefit weights” (Smolensky  et al. 1977),  the ratio Table 4.2  Distributional Impact of Medical Care Subsidies by Household Money Income Decile: 
Mean Value per Recipient Household in 1979 
Benefit  Overall  Money Income Decile 
Measures  Mean 
Row  andType  Value"  Lowest  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Highest 
A. Direct subsidies (Medicare and Medicaid) 
1. Government cost  $1760  $1514  $1784  $1915  $1924  $1852  $1797  $1800  $1741  $1763  $1503 
2.  Market value  2258  1942  2289  2457  2468  2376  2306  2309  2234  2262  1928 
3.  Recipient value  832  442  648  802  893  1029  1080  1072  1080  1074  1077 
4.  Nonrecipient valueb  323  17  51  79  117  168  219  264  351  521  1408 
B. Indirect subsidies'  (tax expenditures) 
5.  Employer-provided health insurance 
6.  Employer-provided sickness & accident insurance 
7.  Tax deductible health care expenses 
530  63  119  187  260  333  407  501  504  688  912 
32  1  3  6  10  15  20  27  34  44  83 
153  35  95  108  116  121  128  137  145  160  330 
SOURCES:  Rows 1,2,3,5,6:  Calculated from March 1980 CPS data tapes. See Smeeding (1982) for the basis of  rows 1,2,  and 3, and Smeeding (1981) for 
rows 5 and 6. 
Row 4: Estimated from March 1980 CPS data tapes; U.S.  Department of  the Treasury (1981); Congressional Budget Office (1981). 
Row  6: Estimated from Steuerle and Hoffman (1979); U.S. Department of  the Treasury (1981). 
"Mean value per recipient household. 
bNonrecipient value equals government  cost of  Medicaid  and Medicare minus (1.045  x  recipient value).  These benefits were distributed  as equal 
proportions of  federal personal income taxes paid by each household with federal income tax liability and divided by the number of taxpaying households in 
each decile to arrive at mean decile values. 
'All  indirect subsidies are measured  at their market value. 157  Measuring and Valuing In-Kind Subsidies 
of  recipient value to market value, rise from 22.8 percent in the lowest 
decile to 55.9 percent in the highest with an overall mean value of  36.8 
percent. This pattern reflects not only low willingness to pay for medical 
benefits at low-income levels but also almost a complete lack of  willing- 
ness to pay for the portion of medical insurance that protects against need 
for institutional care at all income levels. Institutional care benefits were 
$11.8 billion on a government  cost  basis in  1979, 27  percent of  the 
government cost of  Medicare and Medicaid subsidies. 
Nonrecipient benefits (row 4) averaged $323 per taxpaying household 
with a very regressive benefit pattern reflecting the size distribution of 
federal income tax payments by  money income decile. Mean indirect 
benefits  are also regressively distributed,  not  only  because  of  rising 
marginal federal personal income tax rates, but also because mean em- 
ployer cost per beneficiary for employer-provided health insurance in- 
creases from $446 in the lowest decile to $1309 in the highest decile. 
Employer subsidies for sickness and accident insurance follow a similar 
pattern. Because only those who itemize deductions can benefit from 
these deductions, and because itemizers are largely in the highest three 
deciles, benefits are regressively distributed. The regressivity of tax de- 
ductions for health insurance and other tax deductible health care ex- 
penses has previously been established by Steuerle and Hoffman (1979). 
Because mean benefits are calculated per beneficiary household we can- 
not generally add benefits together. However, because over 90 percent of 
those covered by either employer health insurance or employer sickness 
and accident insurance are covered by  both programs we can add these 
benefits together with little loss in accuracy (Smeeding 1981). Combining 
these items we find that a typical employee in the highest decile receives 
an indirect subsidy of  almost $100&somewhat  more than the average 
recipient value of  direct medical subsidies of  $832. 
Turning to table 3 we can more readily assess the distributional impacts 
of  medical subsidies. The conventional method of  valuing in-kind ben- 
efits, at their government cost as in row 2, produces a benefit distribution 
which is quite equalizing in nature. The $8.6 billion of  government cost 
allocated to the lowest income decile is over 42 percent of their aggregate 
post-tax money income share of $20.3 billion. Using a true market value 
measure (row 3) increases this fraction to 54.2 percent  of  disposable 
income. Switching to recipient value (row 4), we find that benefits from 
Medicare and Medicaid are still equalizing in nature, but to a much lower 
degree. In this case, benefits to the lowest decile are only 15.3 percent of 
their disposable income share. Adding recipient and nonrecipient value 
to arrive at our preferred measure of the value of direct subsidies (row 9) 
further reduces the equalizing impact of  medical subsidies. These results 
can be compared to the conventional method of distributing the value of 
Medicare and Medicaid in row 2. Large differences can be noted, particu- Table 4.3  Distributional Impact of Aggregate Medical Care Subsidies by  Money Income Decile in 1979 
(in $ billions) (percent distribution in parentheses) 
Benefit  Money Income Decile 
Measure  Aggregate 
Row  andType  Value  Lowest  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Highest 
1. Postlax money income 
$1341.2  $20.3 
(100.0)  (1.5) 
A. Direct subsidies (Medicare and Medicaid) 
2. Government cost 
43.7  8.6 
(100.0)  (19.7) 
56.1  11.0 
(100.0)  (19.7) 
23.8  3.1 
(100.0)  (12.9) 
22.8  .1 
3.  Market value 
4.  Recipient value 
5. Nonrecipient value" 
(100.0)  (.4) 
B. Indirect subsidies (tax expenditures) 
6.  Employer-provided  health insurance 
17.1  b 



































































































(28.1) 7.  Employer-provided sickness & accident insurance 
b  b  b  b  1.4  .1  .1  .1  .2  .3  .6 
(100.0)  (” 1  (b 1  (” 1  (b 1  (7.1)  (7.1)  (7.1)  (14.3)  (21.4)  (42.9) 
8. Tax deductible health care expenses 
b  3.1  .1  .1  .1  .2  .2  .3  .4  .4  1.3 
(100.0)  (b )  (3.2)  (3.2)  (3.2)  (6.5)  (6.5)  (9.7)  (12.9)  (12.9)  (41.9) 
C. Total subsidies 
9.  Value of direct subsidies‘ 
(4 + 5)  46.6  3.2  4.8  4.4  3.8  3.7  3.5  3.4  3.8  4.9  11.3 
(100.0)  (6.9)  (10.2)  (9.4)  (8.1)  (7.9)  (7.5)  (7.3)  (8.1)  (10.5)  (24.2) 
(6 + 7 + 8)  22.3  .1  .2  .4  .7  1.5  1.9  2.6  3.5  4.5  6.9 
10. Value of  indirect subsidies 
(100.0)  (.4)  (.9)  (1.8)  (3.1)  (6.7)  (8.5)  (11.7)  (15.7)  (20.2)  (30.9) 
(9 + 10)  $68.9  $3.3  $5.0  $4.8  $4.5  $5.2  $5.4  $6.0  $7.3  $9.4  $18.2 
11. Value of  direct plus indirect subsidies 
(100.0)  (4.8)  (7.3)  (7.0)  (6.5)  (7.5)  (7.8)  (8.7)  (10.6)  (13.6)  (26.4) 
Numbers may not sum to totals because of  rounding. 
SOURCES:  Rows 1,5:  Estimated from March 1980 CPS data tapes; U.S.  Department of  the Treasury (1981). Rows 2,3,4,6,7: Estimated from March 1980 
CPS data tapes. See Smeeding (1982) for the basis of  rows 2,3, and 4, and Smeeding (1981) for rows 6 and 7. Row 8: Estimated from Steuerle and Hoffman 
(1979); U.S. Department of the Treasury (1981). 
”Nonrecipient value equals government cost of  Medicaid and Medicare minus (1.045 x recipient value). These benefits are distributed as equal proportions 
of  federal personal income tax paid by each household with federal income tax liability. 
bLess than $.l  billion or less than  .1 percent. 
‘Value of  direct subsidies is estimated by combining recipient and nonrecipient values. 160  Timothy M. Smeeding 
larly for the highest and lowest deciles. For instance, the share of  direct 
subsidies accruing to the highest decile is $1.5 billion or 3.4 percent of 
benefits using the conventional government cost approach, as compared 
to $11.3 billion or 24.2 percent of  benefits when recipient and nonreci- 
pient values are aggregated in row 9.1r 
4.3.4  Housing Subsidies 
The distribution of  housing subsidies are shown in tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
Neither mean  nor  aggregate government cost was  distributed across 
beneficiaries because our definition of market value is akin to the defini- 
tion used by others who have distributed these benefits. Excluded from 
the estimates of  direct subsidies are estimates of  the annual value of 
FHA, VA, and FHMA mortgages. The available information on recip- 
ients of  these  subsidies indicates that the majority  of  benefits were 
received by  households with above average incomes in  1978 (Manser 
1981, p. 52-53).  Thus, if  we  were  able to estimate their  value  they 
apparently would be disequalizing. Also excluded were $2.4 billion in tax 
expenditures for municipal housing bonds, for tax-deferred capital gains 
for those selling their homes and purchasing another within the specified 
time limit, and for the capital gains exclusion for qualifying elderly. These 
would also accrue mainly to upper-income groups (Congressional Budget 
Office  1978). Thus, if  data on omitted types of  public subsidies for 
housing were available we would find their distribution disequalizing. 
Mean market value for public housing (table 4.4, row 1) are progres- 
sively distributed for two reasons. First, over 99 percent of public housing 
benefits accrue to households in the lower 50 percent of  the income 
distribution; secondly, the market value of  these benefits is equal to the 
private market rental value of  the housing unit net of  tenant contribu- 
tions. Because tenant contributions are roughly 25 percent of net income, 
the tenant contribution increases and the net subsidy decreases as income 
increases, all else equal. Recipient values are also propoor because of the 
first reason mentioned above. However, because recipient willingness to 
pay for housing rises with income, the pattern of recipient values is much 
less propoor. Mean benefit weights for public housing increase only from 
59 percent in the lowest decile to 79 percent in the highest decile, with a 
mean value of 65 percent. 
Mean nonrecipient benefits are prorich because of  their income tax 
payments distributor. Mean direct subsidies are even more prorich be- 
cause of  the unequal distribution of  taxes paid by those with itemized 
returns claiming interest deductions, and those with itemized returns 
claiming deductions for state and local taxes paid. Because of  the great 
deal of overlap between these two groups of indirect subsidy beneficiaries 
we may again add mean values with little loss of  accuracy. If  so we find 
overall mean benefits of $635-about  the same as mean recipient values Table 4.4  Distributional Impact of Public Housing Subsidies by Household Money Income Decile: 
Mean Value Per Recipient Household in 1979 
Benefit  Overall  Money Income Decile 
Measures  Mean 
Row  andType  Value”  Lowest  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Highest 
A. Direct subsidies 
1. Market value  $980  $1205  $1070  $796  $531  $552 
2.  Recipient value  636  715  739  496  372  436 
3. Nonrecipient value‘  54  3  8  13  19  27  37  44  59  86  239 
B. Indirect subsidiesd (tax expenditures) 
4.  Mortgage interest  383  23  114  133  184  235  271  319  377  428  613 
5.  Property tax  252  19  51  75  98  123  135  165  198  274  405 
h  h  h  h  h 
h  h  h  h  h 
SOURCES:  Rows 1, 2: Calculated from March 1980 CPS data tapes; Doyle et al. (1980). Rows 3,4,5:  Estimated from March 1980 CPS data tapes; U.S. 
Department of  the Treasury (1978, 1981); Congressional Budget Office (1978). 
“Mean value per recipient household. 
bLess than 30,000 households in this cell. 
‘Nonrecipient value equals  government cost minus (1.045 x recipient value). These benefits are distributed as  equal proportions of federal personal income 
taxes by each household with federal income tax liability and divided by the number of taxpaying households in each decile to arrive at mean decile values. 
dAll indirect subsidies are measured at their market value. Table 4.5  Distributional Impact of Aggregate Housing Subsidies by  Money Income Decile in 1979 
(in  $ billions) (percent distribution in parentheses) 
Benefit  Money Income Decile 
Measure  Aggregate 
Row  andType  Value  Lowest  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Highest 
1. Post-tax money income 
$1341.2  $20.3  $39.0  $62.1  $83.5  $105.6  $130.3  $156.2  $186.1  $229.0  $329.1 
(100.0)  (1.5)  (2.9)  (4.6)  (6.2)  (7.9)  (9.7)  (11.6)  (13.9)  (17.1)  (24.5) 
A. Direct subsidies 
2.  Market value 
4.6  2.2  1.4  .6  .2  .1  .1 
b  b  b  b 
(100.0)  (47.4)  (29.9)  (12.7)  (4.1)  (2.0)  (2.0)  (b  )  (”  )  (b  )  (”  ) 
3.  Recipient value 
3.0  1.3  1  .0  .3  .1  .1  .1  b  b  b  b 
(100.0)  (46.1)  (38.5)  (13.0)  (.7)  (.5)  (.5)  (”  1  (b  1  (”  1  (”  1 
4. Nonrecipient  value” 
b  3.7  .1  .1  .1  .2  .3  .3  .4  .6  1.7 
(100.0)  (”  )  (2.6)  (2.7)  (2.7)  (5.4)  (6.8)  (8.1)  (10.8)  (16.2)  (44.6) B. Indirect subsidies (tax expenditures) 
5.  Mortgage interest 
9.3 
b 
(100.0)  (h  ) 
(100.0)  ("  1 
6.  Property tax 
6.4 
h 
C. Total subsidies 
7.  Value of direct subsidies' 
(3 + 4)  6.7  1.3 
(100.0)  (19.3) 
8. Total value of  indirect subsidies 
(5 + 6)  15.7  h 
(100.0)  ("  1 
(100.0)  (5.7) 
9.  Value of  direct plus indirect subsidies 
(7 + 8)  22.4  1.3 
.I  .1  .2  .3  .6  1.0  1.6  2.0  3.4 
(.7)  (3)  (1.5)  (3.2)  (5.7)  (9.6)  (16.6)  (21.7)  (39.5) 
h  .1  .1  .2  .3  .5  1.0  1.4  2.8 
('  )  (1.3)  (1.4)  (3.1)  (5.3)  (7.7)  (15.5)  (22.3)  (43.5) 
1.1  .4  .2  .3  .4  .3  .5  .6  1.7 
(16.3)  (5.9)  (3.0)  (4.5)  (5.9)  (4.5)  (7.5)  (8.9)  (25.2) 
.1  .2  .3  .5  .9  1.5  2.6  3.4  6.2 
(.6)  (1.2)  (1.9)  (3.2)  (5.7)  (9.6)  (16.6)  (21.7)  (39.5) 
1.2  .6  .5  .8  1.3  1.8  3.1  4.0  7.9 
(5.4)  (2.7)  (2.2)  (3.6)  (5.7)  (8.0)  (13.8)  (17.9)  (35.1) 
Numbers may not sum to totals because of  rounding. 
SOURCES:  Rows 1,2,3:  Calculated from March 1980 CPS data tapes; Doyle et al. (1980); U.S. Department of the Treasury (1981). Rows 4,5,6: Estimated 
from March 1980 CPS data tapes; U.S. Department of the Treasury (1978, 1981); Congressional Budget Office (1978). 
"Nonrecipient value equals government cost of  public housing minus (1.045  x  recipient value). These benefits are distributed as equal proportions of 
federal personal income tax paid by each household with federal income tax liability. 
'Less  than $1 billion or less than .1 percent. 
'Total  value of  direct subsidies is estimated by combining recipient and nonrecipient value (rows 3 and 4). 164  Timothy M. Smeeding 
for direct subsidies. In the highest decile total mean indirect subsidies of 
$1018 are above the overall mean market value of  direct housing sub- 
sidies. 
In table 4.5 benefits as measured by  both the conventional market 
value approach and the recipient value approach (rows 2 and 3) are 
equalizing, while nonrecipient benefits are disequalizing. Adding recip- 
ient and nonrecipient value (row 7) nets out both types of effects, though 
the lowest decile still receives benefits far in excess of  their post-tax 
money  income  share  in  row  1. Indirect  subsidies (row 8)  are quite 
disequalizing, with their size distribution benefiting only the top three 
deciles in excess of  their disposable income share. When  direct  and 
indirect subsidies are combined in row 9 we find a U-shaped distribution 
with beneficiaries in the first and second deciles and in the top two deciles 
benefiting in excess of their post-tax income shares. The net effect seems 
to be slightly propoor with benefits in the bottom two deciles exceeding 
their money income shares to a greater extent than those in the top 
deciles. If  we were able to distribute the housing subsidies not measured 
in this table, the net effect of  all housing subsidies would be roughly 
neutral with respect to both ends of the distribution. Only the middle 
portion of the distribution would have benefits below their money income 
share. 
4.3.5  Combined Values 
Finally, we can add overall medical care subsidies (table 4.3, row 11) 
and housing subsidies (table 4.5, row 9) to get an idea of their net effect 
on the money income size distribution. In addition, we can compare the 
distributional impact of  direct in-kind subsidies using the conventional 
market value (or government cost for medical care) approach as com- 
pared to the recipient value-nonrecipient value approach recommended 
in this paper. Table 4.6 presents these results. 
Part A of  table 4.6 clearly indicates a large difference between the 
conventional market value/government cost approach and the suggested 
recipient plus nonrecipient  benefit  approach to valuing direct in-kind 
subsidies. The suggested approach is much less propoor than the conven- 
tional approach, particularly as far as the highest money income quintile 
is concerned. Adding the value of  indirect subsidies to our suggested 
approach, we arrive at an estimate of  the total net distributive effect of 
these subsidies. As expected, the post-tax money income share of  the 
lowest quintile is below their share of total in-kind subsidies, but not as 
expected, so is the top quintile’s share! That is, accepting our framework, 
the richest 20 percent of  households receive a larger share of  in-kind 
housing and medical subsidies than their share of  money income. 
As one moves down the rows of table 4.6 away from the conventional 
measure of  the size distribution of  direct subsidies toward a different 165  Measuring and Valuing In-Kind Subsidies 
Table 4.6  The Net Effect of Medical Care and Housing Subsidies on the Size 
Distribution of Post-Tax Money Income in 1979 (in $ billions) 
(percent distribution in parentheses) 
Value of  Benefits (billions) 
Middle 
Benefit Measure  Aggregate  Lowest  Three  Highest 
Row  andType  Value  Quintile  Quintiles  Quintile 
1. Post-tax money income  $1341.2 
A. Direct subsidies only 
(100.0) 
2.  Conventional approach"  48.3 
(100.0) 
3.  Suggested approachb  53.3 
(100.0) 
B. Total subsidies 


























Numbers may not sum to totals because of  rounding. 
SOURCES:  Tables 4.3 and 4.5. 
"Market value for public housing (table 4.5, row 2) plus government cost for medical care 
(table 4.3, row 2). 
bRecipient plus nonrecipient value of  direct subsidies (table 4.3, row 9, plus table 4.5, row 
7). Row 3 exceeds row 2 above as a result of  the treatment of  the institutionalized and the 
allocation of  government cost in excess of  the market value of  public housing to nonre- 
cipient beneficiaries. 
'Recipient  plus nonrecipient value of  direct  subsidies (row 3) plus value of  all indirect 
subsidies (table 4.3, row 10, plus table 4.5, row 8). 
approach which includes measuring the effect of  all  types of  public 
subsidies on the income size distribution, the share of subsidies accruing 
to the bottom quintile continues to decline while that of  the top quintile 
increases to a much greater degree. Clearly one's choice of the types of 
in-kind subsidies to include in a distributional analysis, one's approach to 
valuing those subsidies, and their distributors all have an important role 
to play in determining their impact on the income size distribution. 
4.4  Summary and Implications for Social Accounting 
The purpose of  this paper was to demonstrate the policy use of several 
alternative measures of  the value of  public in-kind subsidies. Applica- 
tions were made to a subset of medical care and housing subsidies. Rough 
estimates of  the efficiency gains or losses from the program  delivery 
system were made. The efficiency benefits from the current Medicare 
program and the efficiency costs of current public housing programs were 
shown. Rough estimates of the effect of various valuation approaches on 166  Timothy M. Smeeding 
the money income size distribution were also made. Once all types of 
medical care and housing subsidies covered in this paper were combined, 
we find that both the poor and the rich benefit in excess of their post-tax 
money income shares. Several implications for social accounting can be 
drawn from these results. 
One immediate recommendation is to group all direct and indirect 
subsidies by subsidy category (health care, housing, food, etc.) to deter- 
mine their net budgetary impact and distributional effect. The Congres- 
sional Budget Office (1981) now groups tax expenditures by subsidy area, 
but does not include direct subsidies for the same commodity. Few if any 
analyses of the total impact of public subsidies on income distribution are 
available even in rough form (Wilensky 1981). 
In the area of  efficiency considerations two suggestions can be made. 
First of  all, additional analyses of  the delivery mechanism for public 
in-kind subsidies comparing the government cost, market value, and 
alternative government cost of  providing various subsidies is necessary. 
While we have examined only Medicare and public housing, this analysis 
can and should be extended to other direct and indirect subsidies. For 
instance, can we design a direct federal catastrophic health insurance 
subsidy that achieves the objectives of the current tax deduction subsidy 
system more effectively and more equitably? Second, the concept of 
social benefit value demands additional attention. When all equity and 
efficiency considerations are considered, in-kind subsidies may be more 
efficient and equitable means for reaching certain public goals than are 
equal value cash transfers. 
In the area of  assessing the distributional impact of in-kind subsidies, 
we must begin to clearly differentiate between recipient and nonrecipient 
benefits, particularly in the area of health care and education subsidies. 
The size distribution of the market value or government cost of a particu- 
lar subsidy may suggest misleading conclusions about their impact on the 
extent of poverty or on the inequality of  income. In particular, we must 
develop better estimates of  the recipient value of  public subsidies and 
realize that these values are the conceptually appropriate concept for 
estimating the impact of  in-kind subsidies on poverty,  affluence, and 
inequality. The value of  nonrecipient benefits, which might lead us to 
prefer in-kind subsidies to cash transfers on efficiency or overall equity 
grounds, should be distributed to the true beneficiaries not just allocated 
to recipients by the conventional market value/government cost meth- 
odology. 
We hope this paper will stimulate discussion of these issues and further 
refinement of the concepts suggested above. In our judgment, this line of 
research  will  prove  a cost-effective investment in  more efficient and 
equitable public policy. 167  Measuring and Valuing In-Kind Subsidies 
Notes 
1. We implicitly assume that social cost and government cost are synonymous. 
2.  Government cost may also be defined to include the deadweight loss or welfare costs 
associated with the additional taxes or public debt needed to fund a given subsidy. Further, 
if  means-tested subsidies reduce beneficiary labor supply, an additional indirect cost ele- 
ment may arise (see Moffitt 1981;  Murray 1981). However, we do  not estimate these costs in 
this paper. 
3.  This conclusion  must be tempered by the possibility that a substantial growth in 
HMOs and other forms of  prepaid health care may reduce health care costs below those 
currently experienced  in the predominant  fee-for-service health care system (Ginsburg 
1981b). 
4.  The reader should note that in cases where the government cost of a particular in-kind 
benefit falls short of  the market value of the benefit and where the recipient value exceeds 
the market value of the benefit, recipient value can exceed government cost. For instance, 
suppose a Medicare  beneficiary  finds that he would  have spent an  amount on health 
insurance exceeding the market value of the Medicare benefit package if  presented with an 
equal cash transfer. In this case the cash equivalent value of  the medical care benefit exceeds 
the government cost of providing that specific set of  medical care benefits because of the 
selling cost advantages of Medicare over private insurance providers. 
5. Again we ignore behavioral response to such a change. For instance, transforming an 
in-kind program into an equal welfare benefit cash program may increase participation in 
the cash program (because of  lower stigma cost or other factors), in which case the cost of 
the cash program would rise. 
6. There are a number of  potential distributors for nonrecipient or nonexclusive public 
good benefits (Reynolds and Smolensky 1977; O’Higgins and Ruggles 1981). We chose the 
equal proportion of  income tax distributor,  implicitly assuming an income elasticity of 
demand in excess of unity for these benefits (because of the progressive personal income 
tax). It makes  sense to argue that higher-income households have  a relatively  higher 
demand for in-kind benefits than recipients. Presumably the majority of  in-kind benefit 
recipients, lower-income persons and the elderly, pay lesser portions of federal taxes and 
would prefer equal-cost cash transfers over in-kind transfers because they put a higher value 
on the cash benefits. Further support for such a distributor has been indirectly provided by 
Aaron and McGuire (1970). Alternative  distributors could provide a more progressive 
(e.g., if distributed in proportion to capital income) or less progressive (e.g., if distributed 
on a per capita or per household basis) nonrecipient benefit distribution than the alternative 
we have chosen. For these reasons, we feel that our choice of distributors is both plausible 
and sensible. 
7.  Entries in the value of  benefits column in table 4.1 are exactly equivalent to market 
value as defined in section 4.2 in the case of  public housing.  In the case of  Medicare, 
however, the value of  benefits equals the cost of vendor payments excluding the overhead 
and administrative charges which are appropriately part of  market value when medical 
benefits are measured by their insurance value. This differentiation was necessary to bring 
out the fact that the value of  medical benefits in terms of vendor payments, or insurance 
claims, are held constant when comparing alternative government cost and current govern- 
ment cost in table 4.1. 
8.  For instance,  the Food Stamp program costs roughly 8.5 percent in excess of the 
market value of  the stamps (MacDonald 1977), while the Medicaid program experiences 
claims processing costs averaging 5.4 percent of vendor payments (Smeeding 1982). 
9.  In the earlier literature, it was generally assumed that the market value and govern- 
ment cost of  Medicare and Medicaid were equal. However, recent evidence (Ginsburg 
1981b; table 1) strongly suggests that private market value exceeds government cost. 168  Timothy M. Smeeding 
10. We would like to thank Joseph Minarik for suggesting this strategy. 
11. The aggregate value of  direct subsidies (row 9) exceeds the government  cost of 
subsidies to CPS beneficiaries (row 2) by $2.9 billion because of  taxpayers’ nonrecipient 
benefits on behalf of  the institutionalized who are not covered by the CPS, but who do 
receive Medicaid and Medicare coverage. 
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Comment  Janice Peskin 
Measurement of  in-kind income has received increasing attention from 
academic economists and government statisticians during the last decade. 
This heightened interest primarily has reflected the growth of  govern- 
ment in-kind subsidies and what is perceived as a resulting bias in mea- 
sures of  poverty based on money income alone. In this tradition, the 
paper by Timothy Smeeding considers the valuation issue-that  is, how 
to place dollar values on the in-kind income-and  presents estimates of 
the distribution  of  public in-kind subsidies in the areas of  health and 
housing. 
Smeeding defines four alternative valuations: (1) market value defined 
as the cost of  the goods and services on the private market; (2) govern- 
ment cost defined as the cost to the government of  providing the goods 
and services, including costs of  program management; (3) recipient or 
cash equivalent value defined as the value of the goods and services to the 
recipient, which conceptually is the money income that would be re- 
quired for the recipient to forego the transfer (Hick’s equivalent variation 
concept); and (4)  social benefit value defined as the value of  the goods 
and services to recipients and to nonrecipients; as with cash equivalent 
value this is a welfare concept. 
A number of relationships are posited between the valuations and are 
explored in the empirical sections of  the paper. (1) Government cost 
differs from market value when the government is more or less efficient 
than the private sector in providing an identical good or service. (2) The 
cash equivalent value is generally less than the market value and govern- 
ment cost because the subsidy constrains or induces recipients to spend 
Janice Peskin is a senior analyst with the Congressional Budget Office, Washington, 
D.C.  The views presented here are the author’s  and do not necessarily  represent those of the 
Congressional Budget Office. 172  Timothy M. Smeeding 
more on the good than they would choose to spend if given cash. (3) The 
social benefit value is at least as great as government cost if  the subsidy is 
efficient in an economic sense. (4) The social benefit value is generally 
greater than the cash equivalent value, giving rise to nonrecipient ben- 
efits. 
There are two main purposes of the paper. The first is to point out that 
the different valuations are appropriate for different uses. Specifically, 
government cost is appropriate for studies of  budgetary impacts, and 
comparisons of government cost and market value can be used in studies 
of  government efficiency. The cash equivalent value is appropriate for 
including in-kind income in measures of poverty and income distribution. 
And the social benefit value is appropriate for studies of efficiency and of 
income distribution. While these points are not new, it is always useful to 
stress the importance of  relating measures to their intended uses. The 
second purpose of the paper is to illustrate uses of the alternative values 
of government housing and medical care subsidies in studies of efficiency 
and of  distribution of  income. 
To illustrate efficiency studies, the author compares the direct provi- 
sion by  the government of  health insurance (Medicare) and of  public 
housing to indirect provision through vouchers enabling recipients to 
purchase health insurance and housing in the private market. In this 
illustration, the differences between government costs and private mar- 
ket costs of providing identical recipient benefits are compared. He finds 
that direct provision of  health insurance is more “efficient” than are 
health insurance vouchers but that public housing is less “efficient” than 
are housing vouchers. Efficiency,  which can be interpreted in many ways, 
is used in  a narrow  sense in this illustration.  Measured costs do not 
represent true resource costs, which may differ between direct govern- 
ment provision and indirect provision through vouchers, for example, if 
one is better in controlling upward pressure on prices, in regulating fraud, 
or in reducing unnecessary use of medical care. Moreover, comparisons 
of  alternative delivery systems on economic efficiency grounds cannot 
ignore likely differences in  outcomes for beneficiaries. For example, 
without low-rent public housing, would sufficient low-rent housing in 
inner cities be available to meet the demand, and would it be available to 
all races? In other words, recipient values are not usually independent of 
delivery systems. 
The author then presents estimates of the aggregate values and distri- 
butional  effects of  medical care and housing subsidies by  alternative 
valuation techniques. Both direct subsidies (Medicare, Medicaid, and 
public housing) and indirect subsidies through the tax system (tax deduc- 
tions for employer-provided health and accident insurance, medical care 
expenses, mortgage interest, and property taxes) are considered. Direct 
subsidies include benefits to nonrecipients as well as to recipients. 173  Measuring and Valuing In-Kind Subsidies 
The distributional effects of  the subsidies as estimated by the author 
are generally consistent with our intuition and other studies. The direct 
subsidies to recipients in 1979 were equalizing in that a greater share of 
the subsidies went to the lower-income deciles than their existing share of 
after-tax money income. Of  the direct subsidies considered, most are 
means-tested so that this result is not surprising. The indirect subsidies to 
recipients or tax expenditures were disequalizing; that is, a greater share 
went to the higher-income deciles than their existing share of  after-tax 
money income. The indirect subsidies are regressive because to benefit 
requires itemization on tax returns, because subsidies increase with tax 
rates, and because employer-provided health benefits rise with income. 
The  value of the subsidies for nonrecipients (that is, the altruistic benefits 
enjoyed by nonrecipients) were disequalizing because they were distrib- 
uted in proportion to tax payments. Aggregating all direct and indirect 
subsidies, which is the author’s preferred approach, shows that the shares 
received by  both  the lowest and the highest quintiles exceeded their 
shares of after-tax money income. The middle classes were the big losers. 
However, the assumptions that underlie the distributional estimates 
are often very strong, and the findings are quite sensitive to the assump- 
tions. The least satisfactory aspect of the paper in my view is its measure- 
ment of the values of in-kind subsidies for nonrecipients. To estimate the 
aggregate value for any in-kind subsidy, the author first assumes that the 
total social benefit value equals government cost. (The author states that 
in theory the value at least equals government cost but the estimates are 
based on the equality assumption.) Then the value of benefits to nonre- 
cipients is the difference between government cost and the aggregate 
recipient value plus costs of  program management.  This nonrecipient 
value is distributed across income classes in proportion to tax payments. 
Both resulting aggregate values and their distributions across income 
classes have little justification. As to the aggregate values, there is no 
reason to believe that the social benefit value equals government cost for 
every, or indeed any, in-kind subsidy. To assume so precludes inefficient 
government programs or programs where benefit-cost ratios exceed one. 
It should also be noted that in at least one other study (Smolensky et al. 
1977) nonrecipient values have been taken to equal the  full government 
cost of the subsidy, not just the difference between government cost and 
recipient benefits. 
As to the distribution of the nonrecipient values, the paper treats them 
as pure public goods. Yet nonrecipient benefits accrue to the relatives of 
recipients who would otherwise have paid for some of the consumption of 
health care and housing, as the paper discusses, and to the health and 
construction  industries in the cases of  Medicare-Medicaid and public 
housing, respectively. Moreover, even if  the nonrecipient benefits are 
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questionable (Musgrave 1959).  The distribution of public goods’ benefits 
are, in the real world, unknown (and, given “free rider” problems, some 
would say unknowable). The wisest course, if  they must be distributed, 
would seem to be to use a variety of  alternative distributors, which has 
been done frequently in the economic literature. The distributors for 
public goods’ benefits in the literature have included families (or house- 
holds), income, capital income, disposable income, and the reciprocal of 
the marginal utility of expenditures (Aaron and McGuire 1970; Brennan 
1981; Gillespie  1965). These studies have also found the distributive 
effects of public goods to vary sharply depending on which distributor is 
used. Because of this sensitivity, and the lack of a theoretical or practical 
reason for using tax payments as a distributor, the findings on nonrecip- 
ient benefits are questionable. Moreover, given how little we know about 
recipient benefits from in-kind income, I see little reason to embark on 
such a speculative endeavor as estimating the distribution of nonrecipient 
benefits at this time. 
The estimates of the distributional effects of  indirect subsidies or tax 
expenditures are also unsatisfactory because such subsidies are valued 
only at cost and not in cash equivalents. The inducement to overspend on 
direct  subsidies, which  results  in  cash equivalent  values below  cost, 
applies equally to indirect subsidies. Moreover, if  the improvement of 
income measures for purposes of assessing relative well-being is the goal, 
measuring income on an after-tax basis is preferred. After-tax incomes of 
recipients of  indirect subsidies are higher because of  their receipt of  the 
subsidies. Hence, one cannot add to the after-tax incomes the values of 
the indirect subsidies without double-counting their value. 
The estimates of  direct subsidies to recipients are more satisfactory. 
They are based on cash equivalent values, which rise with income given 
positive income elasticities. Hence, valuation in  cash equivalents (or 
recipient  valuation)  leads  to  distributions  of  subsidies that  are less 
equalizing than are distributions based on cost valuations. The author’s 
ratios  of  cash  equivalent  values to market  values  (so-called benefit 
weights) for Medicare and Medicaid rose from 23 percent in the lowest 
income decile to 56 percent in the highest decile; their average value was 
37 percent. One possible reason for this low value for medical care is that 
subsidies to the institutionalized  are included while expenditures on 
institutional care are for the most part not included in the estimation of 
cash equivalent values. The weights for public housing subsidies rose 
from 59 percent to 79 percent, respectively, with an average value of 65 
percent. 
The estimates of  cash equivalent values in the paper are only rough 
approximations to the true values. True cash equivalent values are mea- 
sured by the money income that would leave the recipient on the same 
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equivalent  values can  be estimated only by  utilizing  assumed utility 
functions. The author’s estimating technique, as I understand it, com- 
pares the consumption of the specific good inherent in the in-kind subsidy 
with the consumption of the same good by similar households without the 
subsidy. To  make the households similar, certain demographic character- 
istics are controlled for and the income level of the nonsubsidized house- 
hold is taken to be the money income plus market value of  the in-kind 
subsidy of  the subsidized household. The cash equivalent value of  the 
in-kind subsidy is then taken to be the consumption of the nonsubsidized 
household when that consumption is less than the market value of the 
subsidy or the market value of the subsidy when the consumption of the 
nonsubsidized household is more than the subsidy. 
As compared to true cash equivalent values, the author’s approxima- 
tion has several biases. First and most importantly, the approach may 
overestimate  cash equivalent  values because the income level of  the 
nonsubsidized household is too high by the difference between the mar- 
ket value and cash equivalent value of  the subsidy. This bias is obviously 
most  important  when  cash  equivalent values fall well  below  market 
values (for example, in the case of  medical care subsidies) and when 
multiple in-kind subsidies are received. On the other hand, the approach 
may underestimate cash equivalent values because preferences for the 
in-kind subsidy of  recipients will be systematically greater than prefer- 
ences of nonrecipients who are also eligible for the subsidy but choose not 
to participate. For example, households with similar incomes and demo- 
graphic characteristics who choose not to buy into the supplementary 
medical insurance  (SMI) portion of  Medicare presumably prefer less 
health insurance relative to other goods in their consumption bundle than 
do SMI recipients. It is not clear which of  these biases will dominate. 
It is true, as the author points out, that estimation by utility functions is 
problematic,  both  because  the  true utility function is unknown  and 
because necessary data, such as geographic price differences, are lacking. 
Nonetheless, given the biases in the author’s approximation,  and the 
uncertainties about cash equivalent values in general, the results pre- 
sented here should be viewed with caution. 
This paper, and others by Smeeding, contribute to the growing litera- 
ture on income in-kind. But considerable research and reform of  our 
income statistics remain before income in-kind can be treated adequately 
and income and poverty measures made meaningful. 
Our official statistics continue to be  deficient in their treatment of 
in-kind income. Poverty measures exclude noncash income despite the 
fact that the Food Stamp program was enacted to provide the cost of 
nutritional diets to low-income families; such costs form the basis of the 
poverty threshold. Measures of  family income based on Bureau of  the 
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income in the National Income and Product Accounts are inconsistent in 
their inclusion of in-kind income-for  example, including Medicare but 
excluding Medicaid-and  deficient in their valuation of  such income, 
which is by government cost rather than cash equivalent value. 
These deficiencies in our official statistics are large and growing. Gov- 
ernment in-kind subsidies to the low-income population grew sharply 
relative to cash income during the 1965-75  period as many of the noncash 
programs like Medicare and Medicaid were first implemented and ex- 
panded. Since 1975, government cash payments to low-income families 
have declined significantly in real terms. As a result, whereas government 
cash benefits accounted for around 40 percent of total benefits (cash plus 
noncash) to low-income families in 1975, by  1983 they are expected to 
account for only 30 percent of  total benefits. In addition, while data are 
lacking, it is likely that employer-provided noncash income has risen 
relative to cash income. 
Improvements in the treatment of noncash income have been made in 
recent years. The Bureau of the Census now routinely collects informa- 
tion on the recipiency of  a few types of  in-kind income in its March 
Current Population Survey and has recently published a study by Smeed- 
ing on valuing public in-kind transfers. If further progress is to be made, 
the most pressing needs are collection of  better data on recipiency of 
private in-kind income and research developing and comparing alterna- 
tive estimates of  cash equivalent values. Only with the inclusion of  this 
expanded information on in-kind income can we be assured that mea- 
sures of  income and their distribution portray with any reality the dis- 
tribution of  well-being across families and over time. 
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